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BENEFICIAL EFFECT OF ADJUSTED SENTENCES ON RECIDIVISM IN FRANCE: 
INVESTIGATING THE HIDDEN ROLE OF THE JUDGE  
Aline Désesquelles (INED), Annie Kensey (French Ministry of Justice), Laurent Toulemon 
(INED) 
Abstract 
Adjusted sentences may be considered as detrimental or favorable to former offenders’ re-
entry. According to the “labelling theory”, alternative-to-incarceration sentences reduce 
recidivism because they are less stigmatizing than prison. The defenders of the “deterrence 
theory” consider that they are too soft to prevent people from reoffending. Results from the 
most recent study conducted in France, show that, after controlling for several characteristics 
of the former inmates, recidivism is significantly higher among those who had fully served a 
prison sentence than among those who benefited from an adjusted sentence. However, this 
does not prove a direct effect of these measures. Beneficiaries may be selected among 
offenders with lower risks of recidivism. Judges in charge of sentences execution also take 
into account the socio-economic environment the inmates will find upon release. In this study, 
we use a cohort built by the French Ministry of Justice (6,869 inmates followed over 5 years 
after release) to further investigate this issue. The database includes the information on the 
court in charge of the inmate’s execution of sentence. We use the inter-court disparity in 
granting adjusted sentences to capture part of the unobserved heterogeneity between inmates 
and examine how it impacts on the link with recidivism.  
 
Key words: Prison population; Recidivism; Adjusted sentences; Justice sentencing system; 
Unobserved heterogeneity; France 
 
Résumé 
Les aménagements de peine sont tantôt considérés comme favorables ou défavorables à la 
réinsertion. Selon la « théorie de l’étiquetage », les peines alternatives à la prison réduisent le 
risque de récidive parce qu’elles sont moins stigmatisantes. Les défenseurs de la « théorie de 
la dissuasion » estiment en revanche qu’elles ne sont pas assez dures pour dissuader de 
commettre une nouvelle infraction. L’étude la plus récente menée en France sur le sujet 
montre qu’une fois contrôlées plusieurs caractéristiques des anciens détenus, la récidive est 
significativement plus élevée chez ceux ayant effectué l’intégralité de leur peine en prison que 
chez ceux ayant bénéficié d’aménagements de peine. Ceci ne fait toutefois pas la preuve d’un 
effet direct de ces mesures. Ceux qui en bénéficient sont potentiellement sélectionnés parmi 
ceux ayant les meilleures chances de réinsertion. Les juges en charge de l’exécution des 
peines prennent aussi en compte l’environnement socio-économique que le détenu trouvera à 
sa sortie. Nous utilisons les données d’une cohorte constituée par le Ministère de la justice 
français (6 869 détenus suivis dans les 5 ans suivant leur libération) pour approfondir ces 
questions. Nous nous appuyons sur la disparité entre tribunaux de grande instance en termes 
de nombre d’aménagements de peine octroyés pour capter une partie de l’hétérogénéité non-
observée entre individus et examiner comment cela modifie le lien avec la récidive. 
 
 
Mots clés : Population carcérale; Récidive; Aménagements de peine; Système judiciaire; 
Hétérogénéité non-observée ; France  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Between January 2002 and January 2018, the number of prison inmates in France increased 
by 42%, from 48 594 to 68 974. This dramatic inflation resulted in prison overcrowding: in 
the same time period, the prison population density increased from 101 to 115 per 100 places 
with the highest density in remand prisons (139 per 100). In order to alleviate prison 
overcrowding, alternatives to traditional custodial sentence that used to be exceptional 
(Tournier et Kensey 2000) have been developed. In this context, the debate about the 
penalties that are more effective to prevent recidivism – and as consequence, to avoid return 
to prison – has received growing interest. After a long phase of consultation, a law on 
“recidivism and individualization of sentences” that includes the inception of a new 
alternative sentence to prison (called “contrainte pénale”) was finally adopted in July 2014. 
The theoretical framework behind this debate relies on three main lines of argument. 
According to the “deterrence theory” (Andenaes 1968), it is assumed that offenders’ behavior 
is driven by a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of criminal activity. As a 
consequence, sentences have to be harsh enough to divert them from reoffending. In contrast, 
the “labelling theory” (Schur 1971) highlights the potential adverse effects of imprisonment 
(criminogenic effects). Prisons are places where detainees are exposed to criminal 
subcultures:  “jails and prisons can be “schools for crime,” where offenders can learn more 
about their possible profession” (Dejong 1997). In addition, spending time in prison provokes 
both a break in the people’s life and a stigmatization that have destructive consequences for 
reintegration release. Lastly, the “rehabilitation theory” (McGuire and Priestley 1995) 
emphasizes the necessity that sentences should not be punitive only, but help the ex-offenders 
in the transformation of self and life-style and prepare them to the adoption of law-abiding 
activities. In this light, alternative-to-incarceration sentences may be considered either as 
detrimental or favorable to former offenders’ sustainable reentry. For the defenders of the 
labelling theory, alternate sentences may reduce recidivism because they are less stigmatizing 
than prison, and they do not induce a break in the people’s life. For those who believe in the 
deterrence theory, alternate sentencing and rehabilitation is too soft to prevent people from 
reoffending.  
In a 1974 paper, Tullock claimed that “we have an unpleasant method -deterrence- that 
works, and a pleasant method -rehabilitation- that (at least so far) never has worked.” Since 
then, a quite large body of literature has developed with the aim to assess these alternate 
methods. It is however difficult to draw general conclusions because studies differ in their 
definition of recidivism, in their setting (e.g. different countries) and in the type of measures 
(home confinement, probation, supervised bonds, community service, diversion, suspended 
sentences, etc.) that are compared with incarceration, not to speak about methodological 
problems that are not negligible. In fact, the literature review provides conflicting results, and 
no compelling evidence of neither a deterrent nor a criminogenic effect of imprisonment on 
future criminal behavior (Villetaz et al 2006, Cid 2009, Nagin, Cullen and Jonson 2009, 
Drago and Galbiati 2012).  
Studies that provide some support to the deterrence theory usually show that things are more 
complicated than it sounds. Referring to previous works that contend that deterrence is a 
conditional phenomenon (Claster, 1967; Toby, 1957), Dejong (1997) tests the hypothesis that 
“the effect of punishment may be contingent on the strength of ties to conventional society or 
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experience in criminal behavior […]. Those more strongly bonded to conventional society 
may be more easily deterred than experienced criminals”. Results of this study provide partial 
support to a “short-term deterrent effect” for offenders incarcerated for long periods: longer 
incarceration predicts longer time until rearrest. But for arrestees with few ties and for first-
time arrestees, incarceration increases the probability of reoffending. Along this line of 
criticism of the deterrence theory, Pogarsky (2007) distinguishes between present-oriented 
individuals that “highly “discount” future events and consequences” and future-oriented 
individuals: “future-oriented individuals should be more deterred by the delayed costs from 
crime than their present-oriented, and hence more criminally prone, counterparts”. In a more 
recent study that takes advantage of quasi-experiments from the state of Georgia (US), 
Kuziemko (2013) estimates that “an extra month in prison reduces the probability that an 
inmate returns to prison within three years of his release by 1.3 percentage points”. At the 
same time, this study provides support to the rehabilitative theory: “the hope of an early 
parole release incentivizes inmates to invest in their own rehabilitation and when such 
incentives are removed investment falls and recidivism rises”. 
Parallel to this, a number of studies have found that prison increases recidivism. Nirel et al 
(1997) compare recidivism over a period of 14 months among 407 offenders sentenced to 
service work to that of 950 comparable offenders sentenced to imprisonment in Israel. Their 
findings indicate that after adjustment for the differences between the two sanctions, “odds 
for recidivism among prisoners were to 1.7 times higher than the odds for service workers”. 
Spohn and Holleran (2002) compare offenders sentenced to prison with offenders placed on 
probation in Jackson County (Missouri). They find that offenders sentenced to prison have 
higher rates of recidivism and recidivate more quickly than do offenders placed on probation. 
Interestingly, drug offenders sentenced to prison had the highest likelihood of recidivism. The 
authors suggest that “this might reflect the fact that for drug offenders imprisonment does not 
meet the central tenet of deterrence theory-that is, that the costs of punishment outweigh the 
benefits of the crime. The risk of being apprehended and sent back to prison, in other words, 
may not outweigh the benefits that offenders receive from using or selling drugs.” In his study 
on recidivism in Spain, Cid (2009) finds that “offenders given suspended sentences had a 
lower risk of reconviction than those given custodial sentences.” Drago and Galbiati (2012) 
examine the impact of prison conditions evaluated by prison overcrowding, number of deaths 
in prison, and degree of isolation, on future criminal behavior in Italy. They do not find 
evidence of deterrent effects of experienced prison severity. Instead, their analysis suggests 
that “harsh prison conditions increase post-release criminal activity, though they are not 
always precisely estimated”. Similarly, Chen and Shapiro (2007), exploiting a discontinuity in 
the mechanism that assigns prisoners to security levels (and hence to prison conditions) in the 
US, concluded “that, if anything, harsher prison conditions lead to slightly higher recidivism 
rates”. Lastly, in contrast with two literature reviews (Renzema and Mayo-Wilson 2005, Aos 
et al 2006) that concluded for no significant effect of electronic monitoring (EM) on 
recidivism, several studies find that this alternate measure to incarceration reduces recidivism. 
Marklund and Holmberg (2009) evaluate a Swedish program that allows prisoners to apply to 
electronic monitoring as long as they have an occupation and they accept regular sobriety 
controls. The authors find that participation in the program is associated with lower 
recidivism but they admit they cannot disentangle between the effect of EM per se and other 
elements included in the program. Di Tella (2009), using data for Argentina, compares the re-
arrest rates of individuals in prison and individuals under electronic monitoring before trial. 
He finds “that the recidivism rate of former prisoners is 22% while that for those ‘treated’ 
with electronic monitoring is 13%.”  A local experiment in four French courts shows that 
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converting prison sentences into EM  would result in a significant reduction in the probability 
of reconviction after 5 years (Henneguelle, Monnery and Kensey, A, 2016). 
 
1.2. Adjusted sentences in the French judicial system 
 
In the French judicial system, adjusted sentences include alternate measures to prison such as 
electronic monitoring, day parole, outside placement as well as conditional release. Since the 
law passed in November 2009, those eligible for an alternate measure to prison are those 
sentenced to one or several terms of detention totaling not more than two years or those who 
have less than two years of penalty remaining. This duration is reduced to one year in case of 
legal re-offending. Conditional release can be granted when the length of the completed 
sentence is at least equal to the sentence remaining to be executed. Alternate measures to 
prison may be pronounced by the judge in charge of the execution of the sentence (“Juge 
d’application des peines” or JAP) as a probationary measure for conditional release. With 
these adjustments, the judicial authority take account of guarantees of good behavior of the 
convicted person in order to shorten the length of imprisonment and to facilitate his 
reintegration upon release. 
Electronic monitoring (EM) was adopted in 1997 and implemented in 2000. It involves fitting 
offenders with an electronic device, typically on the ankle, that is monitored remotely by 
prison officers who check that the individual is not violating a set of pre-established 
conditions. The most common of these conditions is to stay at home during certain pre-
established periods. Still marginal in 2002 (235 between October 2000 and May 2002 
according to Levy et al. 2003), around 10,000 people were under EM as of January 1st, 2016.  
Day parole allows a sentenced person to leave the penal institution in which (s)he is hosted at 
arranged times allowing him/her to exercise a professional activity or training, to seek work, 
to undergo medical treatment, to participate in the life of the family or any other project of 
entry or re-entry into society. People receiving day parole must return the prison to the 
timetables set by the judge.  1,602 people were on day parole as of January 1st, 2016. 
Outside placement may be implemented with or without the supervision of the prison 
administration. Placement outdoors without supervision allows the person to carry out 
activities outside the prison (employment, training, medical treatment, involvement to the 
family life or other proposed plan of integration or reintegration) under the control of the 
administration. The convicted person may, where applicable, be supported by an association 
affiliated to the prison administration. Judges determine the conditions of implementation of 
the measure on the basis of the offenders’ project (nature of the activity, schedule, support 
conditions, wage conditions). Placement outdoors under supervision of the prison 
administration allows also a detainee to perform work outside the prison. Work may be 
performed on behalf of an administration, a public body or possibly a physical or legal 
person. 847 people were on an outside placement as of January 1st, 2018. Among them, 570 
were placed outside and not hosted. 
 
In addition to these measures, inmates also benefit from automatic reduction of sentences that 
however can be withdrawn. The reductions of sentence allow inmates definitely sentenced to 
see their sentence reduced if they satisfied certain conditions, in particular a good behavior in 
custody. These sentence reductions are granted as part of a "credit of reduction", with the 
possibility of withdrawals if the inmate is misbehaving. For sentences longer than one year, 
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during the first year of incarceration, sentence reduction credit is three months, and then it is 
two months during the following years. For sentences of less than a year, it is seven days per 
month. Additional reduction of sentences can be granted for sentence longer than one year 
imprisonment. Additional reductions of sentences are three months per year and 7 days per 
month. For repeat offenders, they are only of two months per year and 4 days per month. All 
decisions concerning the reduction/withdrawal of sentences are made by the JAP.  
Lastly, amnesties may be applied. It is a legislative measure described in articles 133-9 to 11 
of the Criminal Code, and there is no limit to the acts potentially amnestied by the legislator. 
As opposed to pardons, amnesties expunge the sentences pronounced and put an end to all 
(not yet served) sentences. The last amnesty law occurred in 2007. 
 
1.3. Most recent studies on recidivism in France  
 
Several studies have been conducted in France in order to analyse the risk of recidivism of 
former inmates (Kensey&Tournier 1994, Kensey 2007, Kensey et al. 2011). They are based 
on a linkage between two sources. Firstly, a random sample of all inmates released during a 
given timespan is drawn from the “Fichier national des détenus” or FND (national file of 
inmates) where all persons in custody
1
 at a given time are registered. This file contains basic 
socio-demographic and penal characteristics of the inmates at entrance as well as all the 
judicial decisions that occur during their detention. This file is merged with the “Casier 
Judiciaire National” or CJN (criminal history record) where all the sentences concerning a 
given person are kept during at least 40 years for prison sentences.  
The most recent study concerns a cohort of 8,419 inmates released between June 1
st
, 2002 and 
December 31
st
, 2002 (Kensey and Benaouda 2011). New sentences registered in the “Casier 
Judiciaire National” in 2007/2008 have been searched, allowing studying recidivism within 
five years after release. The overall percentage of recidivism defined as receiving another 
custodial sentence was 46%. Recidivism was significantly higher among those who had fully 
served a prison sentence (56%) than among those who benefited from conditional release 
(30%) or from an alternative sentence to prison (47%). Kensey and Benaouda showed that 
recidivism within five years after release depends on gender, age, marital status, employment 
status, nationality, as well as on penal characteristics (offence type, number of previous 
convictions, sentence length, and way the sentence has been served). In their study, all these 
covariates had a significant effect on recidivism when considered altogether within a logistic 
regression. The results were insensitive on whether recidivism was defined as the occurrence 
of a new offence or as a new incarceration within five years after release. After controlling for 
these characteristics, the correlation between adjusted sentences and lower recidivism 
remained significant. 
 
1.4. Aim of the study 
 
This correlation at the individual level may result from a direct “causal” effect of the sentence 
adjustment that would be positive per se for former inmates’ re-entry in the society.  But they 
                                                      
1
 People sentenced to a suspended prison term, to community service work or to judicial supervision are not 
included in this database. 
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may be due to heterogeneity between inmates that is only partially taken into account by the 
studies. In other words, the observed relation between penal treatment and recidivism may not 
be causal but reflect a “common cause”: beneficiaries of adjusted sentences are likely to be 
selected among offenders with the best odds for reinsertion. Here it is important to stress the 
important role plaid by the judges in charge of the execution of the sentences. These judges 
have access to detailed information on the inmates (e.g. behaviour while in prison). Their 
ability to successfully re-enter the society is taken into account for any decision of release, 
while the withdrawal of a sentence reduction is related to misconduct in prison, a proxy for 
more difficult reintegration. Judges’ decisions are discretionary, and it is worth mentioning 
that they may be more or less lenient or voluntarist regarding sentence adjustments. 
Independently from the inmates’ profile, judges’ decision is also shaped by their knowledge 
of the context at large the inmates will find upon release. By context, we mean for instance 
the job and housing opportunities of the place where the inmates will be released, or the social 
workers and associations that will help them re-entering the society. This context may be 
more or less propitious to reinsertion, which, in turn, may impact on the judge’s practice: if, 
the judge has positive feedback on the context, (s)he will be more prone to give sentence 
adjustments, and at the same time, this favourable context should result in reduced risks of 
recidivism.   
Given the importance of the judge in the decision making, authors (Kling 2006 ; Di Tella 
2009) have proposed to take into account the information on the judge in charge of the 
execution of the sentence, or more precisely to use the inter-judge disparity in sentencing in 
the analysis of the link between penal treatment and recidivism. This disparity captures 
altogether unobserved individual heterogeneity, severity and attitude of the judge regarding 
adjustments, and effect of the context at large. The database built by Kensey  et al. does not 
include the precise information about the judge in charge of the inmate’s execution of 
sentence but it includes the court (“Tribunal de grande instance” or TGI) (s)he is affiliated to.  
The aim of the present article is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of adjusted 
sentences in order to reduce recidivism. We use the inter-court disparity in terms of penal 
treatment, once controlled for the observed individual characteristics of the former inmates, to 
capture part of the unobserved heterogeneity between inmates and examine how it impacts on 
the link between adjusted sentences and recidivism.  
 
2. Data and method 
 
2.1. Data  
 
We use the same data as Kensey and Benaouda (2011). After eliminating missing records 
either in the FND or the CJN, this leaves a sample of 6,869 inmates released between June 1
st
, 
2002 and December 31
st
, 2002. Weights have been computed to make this population 
representative of the all inmates released during the study period. Upon release, 1,995 inmates 
were benefiting from conditional release. In the cohorts under study, 1,011 inmates had been 
benefiting from another alternate sentence to prison. The rest of the study population (4,927 
inmates) was released after executing the sentence in prison. Inmates incarcerated in a given 
prison fall under a specific court. We excluded from the analysis 32 courts where there were 
no more than 12 inmates in the sample (totalling 246 inmates) in order to limit random 
variations. The analysis is thus conducted on 6,623 inmates spread over 100 courts.  
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We define recidivism as any new custodial sentence within five years following release, no 
matter if the new offence is the same as the first one. Explanatory variables include offenders’ 
background characteristics such as gender, age (deciles or 10-year age groups), and 
citizenship (France, Other European country, Northern Africa, Other African country and 
Other citizenship). We have access to several indicators of social bond (Dejong 1997) at entry 
such as marital status (Married couple, Non-married couple, Divorced or separated or 
widowed and Other never married), level of education (Illiterate, Elementary school, Lower 
secondary, Vocational, Upper secondary, Upper, Other level of education and Unknown), and 
employment status at entry (Employed, Unemployed and Inactive). The characterization of 
the individual criminal record includes the principal offence type (Homicide, Sexual crime 
and misdemeanour, Other violent crime, Crime against property, Voluntary violence 
(misdemeanour), Other violence/Public order, Other property offence, Swindle, Traffic 
offence, Violation of legislation on foreigners, Drug traffic and Drug use) and the number of 
previous convictions (5 classes). Other variables deriving from the data are sentence length 
(deciles) and pre-trial status (On custody vs. Not on custody) that may depend on both the 
presumed dangerousness of the person and the guarantees (s)he offers in terms of integration 
in the society. Lastly, we created five dichotomous variables (Yes vs. No) that characterize 
the penal treatment during the last imprisonment episode: 1- Presidential amnesty, 2- 
Automatic reduction of prison sentence, 3- Additional reduction of prison sentence, 4- 
Withdrawal/rejection of a reduction of prison sentence and 5- Conditional release/Alternate 
measure to prison. Table A1 in the appendix displays the distribution of the sample according 
to these variables.  
 
2.2. Method  
We use a two-step modelling strategy. First, we run five linear regressions to estimate the 
probability for each inmate to receive a given penal treatment. In these models, the dependent 
variables are the five above-mentioned dummies, and the covariates are the inmates’ 
characteristics listed in the previous section. We estimate two series of indicators at the court 
level: 1- the mean of each penal treatment dummy and 2- the mean residuals of the five 
regressions, i.e. the mean difference between the observed and the predicted proportion of 
inmates receiving a specific treatment in a given court. Mean residuals indicate whether the 
treatment under study is more or less frequent than expected when controlling for inmates’ 
observed characteristics. In order to estimate the heterogeneity between courts, we estimate 
the inter-court variance of these two sets of indicators. We standardize these variances by the 
overall binomial variance in order to compare the different penal treatments. 
In the second step, we run a multilevel model estimating the risk of recidivism controlling for 
the inmates’ observed characteristics (level: inmates) and the mean residuals of the five 
previous regression (level: courts)  (see formulas in the appendix). 
We expect withdrawal/rejection of a sentence reduction to be positively
2
 related to recidivism 
at the individual level, with no major impact of at the court level. We expect conditional 
release/alternate measures to prison to be negatively related to recidivism both at the 
individual and at the court level, because of contextual effects that may facilitate both release 
and reintegration. Similarly we expect additional reductions to be negatively related to 
recidivism at the individual level. We do not have clear assumptions about the relation at the 
                                                      
2
 By “positively” we mean that inmates who were withdrawn/rejected a reduction have higher risks of 
recidivism. 
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court level. On the one hand, additional reductions may be given more easily where prisons’ 
overcrowding is especially high, which could be associated with less selection of the 
beneficiaries; on the other hand, they may be more frequently given where the environment is 
favourable for reintegration. Finally, we expect presidential amnesty and automatic reductions 
of prison sentence to have no impact on recidivism, both at the individual as well as at the 
court level.  
3. RESULTS 
 
From one court to the next, the frequency of withdrawals/rejections of reductions and 
additional reductions are the more varying (Figure 1, black bars). Controlling for individual 
heterogeneity (grey bars), the variance between courts is dramatically decreasing for 
additional reductions. Inter-court variations in terms of automatic reductions and conditional 
release/alternate measures to prison are the least dependent on individual features:  residuals 
are very close to raw estimates. When controlling for the inter-court heterogeneity in terms of 
inmates’ characteristics, the variance between courts is at lowest for amnesty and for 
additional reductions and at highest for withdrawals/rejections of reductions.  
Figure 1: Standardized inter-court standard deviation of the means and the mean 
residuals of the five penal treatments under study  
 
Source: French Ministry of Justice – 2002 cohort of released inmates  
Before running the multilevel model, we evaluate the relation between the five penal 
measures under study and recidivism (Figure 2). For each treatment, the black bars present the 
raw difference between the inmates that received a given penal treatment and the others. Dark 
grey bars present the effect of each treatment when controlling for the fact that inmates may 
also have received another treatment. Light grey bars are based on linear regressions also 
including inmates’ individual characteristics. Withdrawal/rejection of a reduction, automatic 
reduction and amnesty are associated with higher recidivism, contrary to additional reduction 
and conditional release/alternate measures to prison. Inmates who benefited from that 
measure have a 0.14 lower probability to reiterate than others. When controlling for other 
treatments, the direction of the effects does not change. Taking inmates’ individual 
characteristics into account has however a major impact on the estimated relation between 
penal treatments and recidivism. The relation with automatic reduction, amnesty, and 
additional reduction vanishes. Only two penal treatments are significantly correlated with 
recidivism. On the one hand, inmates who benefited from a conditional release/alternate 
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measure to prison were less prone to reiterate, while those who were withdrawn or rejected a 
sentence reduction reiterated more often.  
 
Figure 2: Impact of the five penal treatments on the probability to return to prison 
(results of the linear regressions) 
 
Reading: inmates who have experienced a withdrawal/rejection of a sentence reduction (first black 
bar) have a 14 percentage point increase in their probability to return to prison within five years; 
when all treatments are considered together in the same multivariate linear regression, the difference 
“controlled for other penal treatments” reaches 18% (dark grey bar); finally, when inmates’ 
individual characteristics are also taken into account, the difference is 13% (light grey bar) 
Source: French Ministry of Justice – 2002 cohort of released inmates  
 
Results of the multilevel model are shown on Figure 3. Dots correspond to the relation 
between each penal treatment and recidivism at the individual level. Compared to the results 
of the previous linear regressions, the impact of the five penal is unchanged. Inmates who 
were withdrawn/rejected a sentence reduction reiterated more often, while inmates who 
benefited from a conditional release/alternate measure to prison reiterated less frequently. The 
three other penal treatments do not have any significant effect at the individual level. The grey 
bars correspond to the court-level effects, and they are quite different from the individual-
level effects. Courts where withdrawal/rejection of reduction is more frequent than expected, 
experience less recidivism than others. This effect is large and statistically significant (at the 
5% level). Automatic reductions and amnesty are associated with less recidivism at the court 
level, but no contrast is significant. Regarding additional reductions, we find a large and 
significant effect at the court level: courts where additional reductions are more frequent than 
expected, experience more recidivism than others, while no contrast is visible at the 
individual level. Finally, courts where conditional release/alternate measures to prison are 
more frequent than expected experience more recidivism than others but the effect is not 
significant.   
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Figure 3: Individual and contextual impacts of the five penal treatments on the 
probability to return to prison 
 
Reading: in a multi-level framework, when court effects are considered together with 
inmates’ individual characteristics, inmates who have experienced a withdrawal/rejection of 
a sentence reduction (dots) have a 14 percentage point increase in their probability to return 
to prison within five years; at the court level, the contrast is reversed: inmates depending on a 
court where withdrawal/rejection of a sentence reduction are more frequent than expected 
have a lower probability to return to prison.  
Source: French Ministry of Justice – 2002 cohort of released inmates  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
In this study we use a record linkage concerning a cohort of inmates released from French 
prisons in 2002 to investigate the relation between different penal treatments (conditional 
release/alternate measures to prison and sentence reductions) and recidivism within 5 years 
after release. Since the inmates’ characteristics available in this database partially describe 
inter-individual disparity, we use the inter-court disparity in giving the aforementioned 
treatments to capture part of this unobserved heterogeneity and to evaluate a potential 
“contextual” effect in the judges’ decision process. 
Our assumptions about the relation between the different penal treatments and recidivism, 
both at the individual and at the court level are partially verified. As expected, we find no 
significant relation between presidential amnesty and automatic reductions of sentences on 
recidivism at both levels of investigation. Those who were withdrawn or rejected a sentence 
reduction significantly reiterated more often. Conversely, in line with the results obtained by 
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Kensey and Benaouda (2011), we find that, at the individual level, inmates who benefited 
from a conditional release/alternate measure to prison were less prone to reiterate.  
For these two measures, and contrary to our assumptions, the relation with recidivism at the 
court level is opposite to that observed at the individual-level. As far as 
withdrawals/rejections of sentence reductions are concerned, the inverse relation at the court 
and at the individual level may reflect judges’ selectivity: the more the number of 
withdrawals/rejections, the more they are refused to inmates who are not so “risky”, and so 
the proportion of inmates who will return to prison will be lower. Similarly, the apparently 
“paradoxical” result observed for alternate-to-incarceration measures suggests that a higher 
number of alternate-to-incarceration measures reflects less selectivity of the judges rather than 
a more favourable context. So the more the number of conditional releases, the less selective 
the judge and so the highest the proportion of inmates who are likely to return to prison. A 
similar mechanism may be operating for additional reductions. However, our result may also 
reveal a contextual effect different from the one we anticipated. In a context of limited 
resources, more conditional releases may be associated with more difficulties for the social 
workers and the associations in charge of facilitating former inmates’ reentry into the society, 
to work correctly and to find the appropriate resources. In the end, this could negatively 
impact on recidivism. 
Our study has several limitations. First, the very different size of the courts may induce 
instability of the results. Secondly, we are not able to produce specific results for electronic 
monitoring because this measure was rare in the cohort of released inmates under study. 
Lastly, we did not have access to additional macro-level covariates at the court level. 
Information on associations helping former inmates after release or on prisons’ 
overpopulation would help understanding what circumstances lead to lower recidivism. 
In the end, we find some support for a positive effect of withdrawal/rejection of sentence 
reductions on recidivism, and a negative effect of conditional release/alternate measures to 
prison. Effects of the measures on recidivism at the court level tend to be opposite to that 
observed at the individual-level. We propose an explanation based on the assumption that 
inmates are heterogeneous, that judges know about this heterogeneity, and that they give the 
benefit of adjustments to the “best” inmates, those who have the best prospects for 
reintegration.  
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Appendix 
 
Formulas 
 
Let  
- i be the individual 
- yi be the probability of recidivism 
- Xi be some individual characteristics 
- Zi the penal treatment (five dummies) 
A first model, at the individual level, may be written as: 
 =  +  + 	 
We use a linear regression, in order to compare different regression models in a consistent 
way, based on the average marginal effects (as the grand mean of yi is close to 0.5, a logistic 
regression gives very similar results).  
 
We estimate court-level variables 
- The mean value for each court of the dummies Zi: 
̅ =
1
()∈
 
- For each zi we estimate the probability of each penal treatment from the individual 
characteristics Xi and the mean residuals at the court level: 
 =  +  
̌ =
1
()∈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- The vector of mean residuals is .  
 
We run a multi-level model with court-level covariates (penal treatment residuals) assumed to 
have a linear effect on recidivism probabilities:  
 =  +  +  + 	 
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Table A1: Characteristics of the sample (n= 6,869) 
 
Source: French Ministry of Justice – 2002 cohort of released inmates  
  
Unweighed Weighed
Female 12.1% 4.0%
Male 78.9% 96.0%
Average age at release (years) 32.1 30.8
CITIZENSHIP
France 73.3% 72.9%
Other European country 9.1% 8.0%
Northern Africa 9.1% 11.3%
Other African country 5.1% 5.1%
Other 3.4% 2.8%
MARITAL STATUS
Married couple 14.9% 11.4%
Non-married couple 15.0% 14.7%
Never married 60.7% 66.6%
Divorced/separated/widowed 9.4% 7.3%
EDUCATION
Illiterate 4.4% 4.1%
Elementary school 22.6% 22.5%
Lower secondary 28.5% 28.4%
Vocational 23.2% 25.1%
Upper secondary 5.1% 4.4%
Upper 3.4% 2.3%
Other 3.6% 4.2%
Unknown 9.2% 8.9%
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
Employed 33.4% 33.7%
Unemployed 21.0% 23.0%
Inactive 45.6% 43.3%
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Table A1 (Continued): Characteristics of the sample (n= 6,869) 
 
Source: French Ministry of Justice – 2002 cohort of released inmates  
Unweighed Weighed
PRINCIPAL OFFENCE TYPE
Homicide 4.4% 1.5%
Sexual crime and misdemeanour 14.3% 4.7%
Other violent crime 5.0% 1.7%
Crime against property 3.5% 3.3%
Voluntary violence (misdemeanour) 5.7% 8.2%
Other violence/Public order 3.3% 3.8%
Other property offence 28.5% 44.5%
Swindle 7.6% 3.4%
Traffic offence 6.5% 10.7%
Violation of legislation on foreigners 3.9% 5.7%
Drug traffic 8.5% 7.3%
Drug use 8.6% 5.1%
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS
None 48.5% 37.8%
1 17.0% 17.0%
2 9.7% 11.6%
3 to 4 11.1% 13.5%
5 and over 13.7% 20.1%
Average sentence length (years) 2.5 1.4
PRETRIAL STATUS
Not on custody 55.0% 63.4%
On custody 45.0% 36.4%
ALTERNATE MEASURE  TO PRISON
Daily release 10.6% 9.3%
Outside placement/electronic monitoring 4.1% 4.1%
None of these measures 85.3% 86.7%
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
Yes 17.4% 6.1%
No 82.6% 93.9%
